“We Knew Americans Wanted War Long Before they Launched First Missiles”

Lieutenant General Spasoje Smiljanić was assigned the hardest task during NATO aggression on Yugoslavia (March 24-June 11, 1999), of commanding the Yugoslav Army Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defense in the war against 800 times stronger enemy, consisting of 19 richest, most powerful Western states. According to General Smiljanić, this was the most disproportionate, uneven and unjust war in the history of warfare.

On the occasion of book by General Smiljanić coming fresh out of press, Večernje Novosti started a serial consisting of excerpts from the book, alongside an interview with the author.

“NATO Aggression: Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defense in Protection of the Fatherland”, by General Smiljanić, is the firsthand testimony, showing NATO aggression in full light, as the author reveals all relevant aspects of the first air-space war recorded in history. Reviewers, Generals Radovan Radinović and Mladen Karanović recommend Smiljanić’s book as a mandatory literature in the military schools and academies.

Asked where did the information about the beginning of NATO air strikes find him, Smiljanić said:

“I learned NATO started its air strikes from the Chief of Operating Center of Military Air Force [Ratno vazduhoplovstvo -- RV, in Serbian] and Anti-Aircraft Defense [Protiv-vazdušna odbrana, PVO] Colonel Miloš Gordić. I received the information around 19:00 hours [7 pm] on March 24. At that time, I was in the office of RV and PVO Commander in the RV and PVO Headquarters in Zemun.”

Q: Did you expect the attack?

General Smiljanić: It became clear much earlier, at the time of the escalation of the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija in 1998, that Americans do not intend to resolve the conflict peacefully, by political means. In fact, it was obvious United States was fanning the flames, in order to use the crisis as an opportune moment to achieve radical goals on the territory of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY, at the time, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro].

Already in 1998 the plans for NATO air aggression were fully prepared, and the execution was postponed by the Milošević-Holbrooke Agreement in October 1998. In March 1999, when a formal political pretext for the aggression was secured in Paris [Rambouillet Accord], armed aggression was certain. Our intelligence officers informed me on March 19 the first airstrikes should be expected in 4-5 days.

Q: To which extent was our Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defense prepared for such a war?

General Smiljanić: We have done and undertaken everything humanly possible to prepare for the aggression. This is to say that, first and foremost, we did our best to avoid major loss of life and rapid destruction of the main combat systems of the military structure and technology. It makes no sense to even speak about some sort of readiness to efficiently and successfully confront the aggressor in the air.

Q: Who issued an order to launch NATO bombers?

General Smiljanić: NATO Secretary General Javier Solana informed the international public on March 23 that he ordered NATO military commander for Europe, General Wesley Clark, to initiate the airstrikes against FRY. However, General Clark in his book “Waging Modern War” said he was waiting for an order to start the aggression from Washington. The aggression started only when the commander of Joint Chief of Staff of USA, General Hugh Shelton, passed on the order from the top of American state command, on March 24, in the afternoon hours.

Q: What was the main goal of NATO aggression against Yugoslavia: prevention of the “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo and Metohija and toppling Milošević, as the West claims, or the aspiration of United States to assert complete control over the Balkans, in order to continue the expansion from here to Middle East, Danube basin, Caucasus region and Siberia?

General Smiljanić: I have analyzed the goal of the aggression in detail in the book, but this is the gist — there is massive evidence which proves United States was determined to place former Yugoslavia under its dominance and drive it into the Western sphere of interest. That is why it was essential to break up Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a state entity and dismember Serbia.

This is further confirmed by the statement of then-US President Bill Clinton, given on Pascha 1999, in support of their soldiers: “Our military mission is dangerous and difficult, but it is necessary and just. We have to stand together with our NATO allies. Our task is to make Milošević pay the highest price for his policy of repression and to seriously diminish the military capacity which is conducting this policy.” Addressing American public on March 24, 1999, President Clinton stressed that bombardment of Yugoslavia is in American political and economic interest — the protection of Albanians was merely a good pretext and an excuse.

Former NATO Secretary General George Robertson said in Strasbourg on October 19, 1999: “Of course, in addition to defending our values, we were also defending our strategic interests”.

Statements such as these lead to the conclusion that forced stories about “ethnic cleansing” and the staged humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo and Metohija were not the real reason behind the aggression against Yugoslavia.

They Couldn’t See a Thing Beyond Their Big Guns…

Q: With how many aircrafts was the first strike carried out? What was its objective?

General Smiljanić: The first strike was carried out in two waves. It started at 19:41 hours [7:41 pm] on March 24 and lasted until 3:30 [am] on March 25. It was carried out with some 200 combat aircrafts and around 50 cruise missile. The objective of the strike was to break down, if not completely destroy the Anti-Aircraft Defense of our country. About this strike, Wesley Clark said he decided to attack a large number of targets on the first night, hoping this would make the next stage of operation — “if necessary” — easy.

Q: How do you interpret this statement by General Clark?

General Smiljanić: I believe the general expected Yugoslav Army to capitulate after the first wave of strikes. Apparently, he thought that the second stage of the planned aggression, involving attacks against the Yugoslav Army ground troops in Kosovo and Metohija, will not be needed.

Q: In your book, you wrote that aggression against FRY started long before the beginning of bombardment?

General Smiljanić: Precisely. The unarmed aggression against the just-formed state of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia started in 1992, right after the US President George Bush Senior announced that “serious events in Serbia and Montenegro represent a dangerous threat to United States national security, foreign policy and economy”. We know what took place afterward, and I covered those events in detail in the book. In 1997 United States opened the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija, which culminated in 1998, and at the beginning of 1999 it carried out an armed aggression, as the final stage of the doctrine of “low intensity conflicts”.

Q: Speaking of the proportion between the parties involved in the war, you claim that was the most disproportionate and uneven conflict in the history of warfare.

General Smiljanić: General balance of power and potential of the countries involved in this war was incomparable and entirely disadvantageous for the defender.

For example, the spatial ratio was 228,000-1 in square kilometers; the population ratio, in millions, was 67-1; the state budget, in billions of dollars, 860-1. The proportion of combat efficiency in regards to the number of troops engaged and in the logistic and technological sense is also beyond comparison. Our combat systems and military technology were lagging 30 years behind the aggressor. The aggressor was resupplying his combat forces from completely renewed sources, and the defender from those which are completely obsolete. It was a totally asymmetrical war and it belongs to the category of the most uneven and unjust wars in the history of warfare.

Q: Based on which evaluation did General Clark promise he will break down the defense of our country after only few brutal airstrikes?

General Smiljanić: That assessment was based solely on the advantages of the technical and technological factor and the power of weapons NATO had at its disposal. They could not see our men (or their own) — soldier, commander, defender of his country, a professional determined to defend his land. They have also failed to see the nation which, to the greatest extent, stood by its Army and their defenders.

Q: You said that NATO aggression was an air-space operation?

General Smiljanić: There is no doubt about that. It is a fact that has also been confirmed by the research and data compiled by the Russian experts, such as Academician, Professor at the Russian Academy of Military Science Vladimir Slipčenko: “Over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia theater, 8-12 space devices were stationed simultaneously and constantly which, together with the air and water carriers, represented the basis of the reconnaissance-assault combat systems.”

Round-the-clock monitoring of the theater was conducted from space, as well as guiding of the missiles, photographic recording of the terrain, etc.

Q: Why did you restrict launching of the MiG-21 aircrafts?

General Smiljanić: That order at the very start of the first wave of strikes, was a result of my deep conviction — and experience, since I have been flying that aircraft for 29 years beforehand — that those planes have no chance to withstand a confrontation with NATO aircrafts. It was a decision based on responsibility for the lives of those men, pilots who would fly into the battle against NATO planes.

Q: How many warplanes and cruise missiles in total did NATO engage during the aggression? What was the largest number of enemy aircraft attacking in one day?

General Smiljanić: At the end of aggression, NATO had 1,040 aircrafts engaged, which was an increase of 124 percent in respect to the beginning of the aggression. It had launched around 1,000 cruise missiles, which is also an increase of around 120 percent. In the 78 days, NATO aviation conducted some 26,100 take-offs. Combat aviation carried out 18,168 flights (70 percent), and support aircrafts 7,927 (30 percent) of flights. Daily strikes by combat aircrafts averaged at 232 flights, and 121 flights of support planes. The biggest daily assault was carried out on May 26. It involved 535 flights of the bombardier aircrafts. A total of around 2,300 strikes were carried out on the territory of Yugoslavia, with 8,800 fire discharges.

Q: What is the total weight of deadly cargo dropped on Yugoslavia, how many projectiles were launched and which ones?

General Smiljanić: NATO launched around 415,000 projectiles on the territory of Yugoslavia, of varied kind, mass and destructive power. They discharged some 350,000 cassette bombs-projectiles, 30,000-50,000 depleted uranium shells and around 15,000 big projectiles (non-guided and guided missiles and rockets), with total mass of around 22,000 tonnes.

Against the Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defense forces, NATO launched around 21,410 different projectiles, with total mass of around 4,000 tonnes. Military Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defense suffered grave destruction of infrastructure, with 958 facilities destroyed or seriously damaged, and destruction of around 40 percent of the combat systems. We lost 39 (0,19 percent of engaged) members of the Army Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defense in NATO aggression.

But it was civilians and civilian objects that suffered the biggest losses and destruction by the NATO aggressor. They were exposed to 3,381 strikes, or 38,4 percent of the total strikes carried out against Yugoslavia. Over 1,500 civilians were killed by NATO, more than 10,000 were wounded, while 271 defense (Yugoslav Army) member was killed. NATO destroyed 119 civilian infrastructure objects, and severely damaged another 907. Around 25,000 residential objects were destroyed. I gave a detailed account about the consequences of NATO aggression in the book.